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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the complexity of the problem of finding a stable fractional match-
ing in a hypergraphic preference system. Aharoni and Fleiner proved that there exists a stable
fractional matching in every hypergraphic preference system. Furthermore, Kintali, Poplawski,
Rajaraman, Sundaram, and Teng proved that the problem of finding a stable fractional match-
ing in a hypergraphic preference system is PPAD-complete. In this paper, we consider the
complexity of the problem of finding a stable fractional matching in a hypergraphic preference
system whose maximum degree is bounded by some constant. The proof by Kintali, Poplawski,
Rajaraman, Sundaram, and Teng implies the PPAD-completeness of the problem of finding a
stable fractional matching in a hypergraphic preference system whose maximum degree is 5. In
this paper, we prove that (i) this problem is PPAD-complete even if the maximum degree is
3, and (ii) if the maximum degree is 2, then this problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Furthermore, we prove that the problem of finding an approximate stable fractional matching in
a hypergraphic preference system is PPAD-complete.
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1 Introduction
The stable matching model introduced by Gale and Shapley [7] is one of the most important
mathematical models for matching problems. The classical stable matching model is defined
on undirected graphs. Thus, this model is naturally generalized to hypergraphs. It is not
difficult to see that there exists an instance of the stable matching problem in hypergraphs
that has no stable hypergraph matching. Thus, in this paper, we consider the following
relaxation concept called a fractional matching. In the ordinary stable matching problem,
the value 0 or 1 is assigned to each edge. On the other hand, in a fractional matching, a
real number between 0 and 1 is assigned to each edge. Fortunately, it is known [1] that
there exists a stable fractional matching in every hypergraph. The proof of this result in [1]
was based on Scarf’s Lemma [16]. For example, the concept of stable fractional matchings
in hypergraphs is used in [2, 3, 13]. It should be noted that stable fractional matchings
1 This research was supported by JST PRESTO Grant Number JPMJPR1753, Japan.
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in hyergraphs are closely related to the stable matching problem with couples [4] that is a
practically and theoretically important variant of the stable matching problem (see, e.g.,
[3, 13]). In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a stable fractional matching in a
hypergraph.
For considering the computational complexity of a problem for which every instance is
guaranteed to have a solution, Megiddo and Papadimitriou [11] introduced the complexity
class TFNP that consists of all search problems in NP for which every instance is guaranteed
to have a solution. The class PPAD introduced by Papadimitriou [14] is the class of all
search problems such that the above property (i.e., every instance is guaranteed to have a
solution) is proved by using a directed parity argument. Some problem A in PPAD is said to
be PPAD-complete, if every problem in PPAD is reducible to A in polynomial time.2 The
assumption that PPAD contains hard problems is considered as a reasonable hypothesis (see
e.g., [15, Section 2.4.1]). Thus, it is reasonable to consider that a PPAD-complete problem
is hard. For example, it is known [5, 6] that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium [12]
is PPAD-complete.
Kintali, Poplawski, Rajaraman, Sundaram, and Teng [10] proved that the problem of
finding a stable fractional matching in a hypergraphic preference system is PPAD-complete.
In this paper, we consider the complexity of the problem of finding a stable fractional
matching in a hypergraphic preference system whose maximum degree is bounded by some
constant. It is natural to consider that in many practical applications, the length of a
preference list (i.e., the degree of a vertex) is constant. Thus, it is important to reveal
the complexity of this problem with low constant degree. The proof by Kintali, Poplawski,
Rajaraman, Sundaram, and Teng [10] implies the PPAD-completeness of the problem of
finding a stable fractional matching in a hypergraphic preference system whose maximum
degree is 5. However, to the best of our knowledge, the complexity of the problem of finding a
stable fractional matching in a hypergraphic preference system whose maximum degree is at
most 4 is open. In this paper, we prove that (i) this problem is PPAD-complete even if the
maximum degree is 3, and (ii) if the maximum degree is 2, then this problem can be solved in
polynomial time. Furthermore, we prove that the problem of finding an approximate stable
fractional matching in a hypergraphic preference system is PPAD-complete.
2 Problem Formulation and Main Results
A hypergraphic preference system P consists of the following two components. The first
component is a finite hypergraph (V,E). The second component is a set of strict total orders
v for vertices v in V such that for each vertex v in V , v is a strict total order on E(v),
where for each vertex v in V , we denote by E(v) the set of hyperedges e in E such that
v ∈ e. We denote by P = (V,E, {v}) this hypergraphic preference system P . Notice that
if |e| = 2 for every hyperedge e in E, then P is just an instance of the well-known stable
roommate problem (see, e.g., [8]). Define deg(P ) := maxv∈V |E(v)|.
Assume that we are given a hypergraphic preference system P = (V,E, {v}). Then a
vector x in RE+ is called a fractional matching in P , if
∑
e∈E(v) x(e) ≤ 1 for every vertex v in
2 A polynomial-time computable function f is called a polynomial-time reduction from a problem B
in PPAD to a problem A in PPAD, if for every instance IB of B, f(IB) is an instance of A, and
furthermore there exists a polynomial-time computable function g such that for every solution y of
f(IB), g(y) is a solution of IB . A problem A in PPAD is said to be PPAD-complete, if for every
problem B in PPAD, there exists a polynomial-time reduction from B to A.
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V , where R+ is the set of non-negative real numbers. Furthermore, a fractional matching x





It is known [1, Theorem 2.1] that there exists a stable fractional matching in every hyper-
graphic preference system. The problem called Fractional Hypergraph Matching is
defined as follows. In this problem, we are given a hypergraphic preference system P . Then
the goal of this problem is to find a stable fractional matching in P . The following result
about the computational complexity of Fractional Hypergraph Matching is known.
I Theorem 1 (Kintali, Poplawski, Rajaraman, Sundaram, and Teng [10, Theorem 5.7]). Frac-
tional Hypergraph Matching is PPAD-complete.
The proof by Kintali, Poplawski, Rajaraman, Sundaram, and Teng [10] implies the PPAD-
completeness of the problem of finding a stable fractional matching in a hypergraphic
preference system P such that deg(P ) = 5. However, to the best of our knowledge, the
complexity of the problem of finding a stable fractional matching in a hypergraphic preference
system P such that 2 ≤ deg(P ) ≤ 4 is open. (If deg(P ) = 1, then the answer of Fractional
Hypergraph Matching is trivial.) In this paper, we prove the following theorems.
I Theorem 2. Fractional Hypergraph Matching in a hypergraphic preference system
P such that deg(P ) = 3 is PPAD-complete.
It should be noted that Theorem 2 implies the PPAD-completeness of Fractional Hy-
pergraph Matching in a hypergraphic preference system P such that deg(P ) = 4. (It is
sufficient to add a vertex with degree 4 to the instance used in the proof of Theorem 2.)
I Theorem 3. Fractional Hypergraph Matching in a hypergraphic preference system
P such that deg(P ) = 2 can be solved in polynomial time.
Furthermore, we consider Approximate Fractional Hypergraph Matching that is
an approximate variant of Fractional Hypergraph Matching. In this problem, we are
given a hypergraphic preference system P = (V,E, {v}) and a positive rational number ε
that may depend on |V | and |E|. Then a fractional matching x in RE+ is said to be ε-stable,




x(f) ≥ 1− ε.
Notice that since a stable fractional matching in P always exists, an ε-stable fractional
matching in P always exists. The goal of this problem is to find an ε-stable fractional
matching in P . We prove the following theorem.
I Theorem 4. Approximate Fractional Hypergraph Matching is PPAD-complete.
3 Proof of Theorem 2
For proving Theorem 2, we need the following lemma.
I Lemma 5. Assume that we are given a hypergraphic preference system P such that
deg(P ) ≥ 4. Then there exists a hypergraphic preference system Q such that (i) deg(Q) = 3
and (ii) we can construct a stable fractional matching in P from a stable fractional matching
in Q in polynomial time. Furthermore, we can construct Q in polynomial time.
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Before proving Lemma 5, we prove Theorem 2 by using this lemma.
Proof of Theorem 2. It follows from Theorem 1 that Fractional Hypergraph Match-
ing in a hypergraphic preference system P such that deg(P ) = 3 is in PPAD. Furthermore,
Theorem 1 and Lemma 5 imply that every problem in PPAD is reducible to Fractional
Hypergraph Matching in a hypergraphic preference system P such that deg(P ) = 3 in
polynomial time. This completes the proof. J
3.1 Proof of Lemma 5
In this subsection, we prove Lemma 5. The following proof is inspired by the proof of the
PPAD-completeness of Preference Game with degree 3 by Kintali, Poplawski, Rajaraman,
Sundaram, and Teng [10].
Assume that we are given a hypergraphic preference system P = (V,E, {v}) such that
deg(P ) ≥ 4. Then we construct a new hypergraphic preference system Q = (W,F, {Bv}) as
follows (see Figure 1). Define
W :=
{




vi | v ∈ V, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |E(v)| − 1}
}
.
For each vertex v in V and each hyperedge e in E(v), we define
r(v, e) := 1 + |{f ∈ E(v) | f v e}|.
For each hyperedge e in E, we define e := {vr(v,e) | v ∈ e}. Define E := {e | e ∈ E} and
F := E ∪
{
{vi, vi}, {vi, vi+1} | v ∈ V, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |E(v)| − 1}
}
.
For each vertex v in V and each integer i in {1, 2, . . . , |E(v)|}, we denote by hvi the hyperedge
e in E such that vi ∈ e. For each vertex w in W , we define the strict total order Bw as
follows. We first consider the case where w = vi for some vertex v in V and some integer i
in {1, 2, . . . , |E(v)|}. It suffices to consider the case where |E(v)| ≥ 2. In this case, we define
hv1 Bw {v1, v1} if i = 1
{v|E(v)|−1, v|E(v)|}Bw hv|E(v)| if i = |E(v)|
{vi−1, vi}Bw hvi Bw {vi, vi} otherwise.
Next we assume that w = vi for some vertex v in V and some integer i in {1, 2, . . . , |E(v)|−1}.
In this case, we define {vi, vi}Bw {vi, vi+1}. Since |W | ≤ 2|V ||E| and |F | ≤ |E|+ 2|V ||E|,
Q can be constructed in polynomial time. Furthermore, deg(Q) = 3.
In what follows, we prove that we can construct a stable fractional matching in P from
a stable fractional matching in Q in polynomial time. Assume that we are given a stable
fractional matching z in Q. Then we define the vector x in RE+ by x(e) := z(e). Clearly,
we can construct x from z in polynomial time. What remains is to prove that x is a stable
fractional matching in P . For proving this, we need the following lemma.
I Lemma 6. For every vertex v in V and every integer i in {1, 2, . . . , |E(v)| − 1},























Figure 1 (a) A vertex v and the hyperedges containing v. We assume that e1 v e2 v e3 v e4.
(b) The copies of v in Q and the hyperedges containing these copies. For every integer i in {1, 2, 3, 4},
we have hvi = ei.
Proof. Let v be a vertex in V such that |E(v)| ≥ 2. We prove by induction on i.




z(e) = z(hv1) + z({v1, v1}).
This implies that z({v1, v1}) ≤ 1 − z(hv1). For proving (T1) by contradiction, we assume
that z({v1, v1}) < 1− z(hv1). Since z is a stable fractional matching in Q, at least one of the
following statements holds.
1 = z({v1, v1}) +
∑
e∈F (v1) : eBv1{v1,v1}
z(e) = z({v1, v1}) + z(hv1). (1)
1 = z({v1, v1}) +
∑
e∈F (v1) : eBv1{v1,v1}
z(e) = z({v1, v1}). (2)
However, since z(hv1) ≥ 0, the above assumption implies that z({v1, v1}) + z(hv1) < 1 and
z({v1, v1}) < 1. These observations contradict (1) and (2). Thus, z({v1, v1}) = 1− z(hv1).




z(e) = z({v1, v1}) + z({v1, v2}).
Since (T1) for the case of i = 1 implies that z({v1, v1}) = 1− z(hv1), we have z({v1, v2}) ≤
z(hv1). For proving (T2) by contradiction, we assume that z({v1, v2}) < z(hv1). Since z is a
stable fractional matching in Q, at least one of the following statements holds.
1 = z({v1, v2}) +
∑
e∈F (v1) : eBv1{v1,v2}
z(e) = z({v1, v2}) + z({v1, v1}). (3)
1 = z({v1, v2}) +
∑
e∈F (v2) : eBv2{v1,v2}
z(e) = z({v1, v2}). (4)
Since (T1) for the case of i = 1 implies that z({v1, v1}) = 1− z(hv1), the above assumption
implies that
z({v1, v2}) + z({v1, v1}) = z({v1, v2}) + 1− z(hv1) < z(hv1) + 1− z(hv1) = 1.
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This contradicts (3). Furthermore, since z is a fractional matching in Q, we have z(hv1) ≤ 1,
Thus, the above assumption implies that z({v1, v2}) < 1. This contradicts (4), and completes
the proof of z({v1, v2}) = z(hv1).
Let k be an integer in {2, 3, . . . , |E(v)| − 1}, and we assume that this lemma holds in the
case of i = k − 1. Then we prove that this lemma holds in the case of i = k. Since z is a




z(e) = z({vk−1, vk}) + z(hvk) + z({vk, vk}).
Since the induction hypothesis implies that
z({vk−1, vk}) + z(hvk) + z({vk, vk}) =
k−1∑
j=1
z(hvj ) + z(hvk) + z({vk, vk}),
we have




For proving (T1) by contradiction, we assume that the inequality in (5) strictly holds. Since
z is a stable fractional matching in Q, at least one of the following statements holds.
1 = z({vk, vk}) +
∑
e∈F (vk) : eBvk{vk,vk}
z(e) = z({vk, vk}) + z({vk−1, vk}) + z(hvk). (6)
1 = z({vk, vk}) +
∑
e∈F (vk) : eBvk{vk,vk}
z(e) = z({vk, vk}). (7)
However, the above assumption and the induction hypothesis imply that
z({vk, vk}) + z({vk−1, vk}) + z(hvk) = z({vk, vk}) +
k−1∑
j=1







z(hvj ) = 1.
This contradicts (6). Furthermore, since z ∈ RF+, z({vk, vk}) < 1 follows from the above
assumption. This contradicts (7). This completes the proof of (T1).




z(e) = z({vk, vk}) + z({vk, vk+1}).
Since (T1) for the case of i = k implies that
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For proving (T2) by contradiction, we assume that the inequality in (9) strictly holds. Since
z is a stable fractional matching in Q, at least one of the following statements holds.
1 = z({vk, vk+1}) +
∑
e∈F (vk) : eBvk{vk,vk+1}
z(e) = z({vk, vk+1}) + z({vk, vk}). (10)
1 = z({vk, vk+1}) +
∑
e∈F (vk+1) : eBvk+1{vk,vk+1}
z(e) = z({vk, vk+1}). (11)
Notice that (8) and the above assumption implies that
z({vk, vk+1}) + z({vk, vk}) <
k∑
j=1
z(hvj ) + 1−
k∑
j=1
z(hvj ) = 1.
This contradicts (10). Furthermore, (8) and z ∈ RF+ imply that
∑k
j=1 z(hvj ) ≤ 1. This and
the above assumption imply that z({vk, vk+1}) < 1. This contradicts (11), and completes
the proof. J
We are now ready to prove that x is a stable fractional matching in P . We first prove
that x is a fractional matching in P . Let v be a vertex in V . Define k := |E(v)|. If k = 1,
then∑
e∈E(v)
x(e) = z(hv1) ≤ 1.










z(hvi ) + z(hvk)





where the inequality follows from the fact that z is a fractional matching in Q.
Lastly, we prove that x is a stable fractional matching in P . Let e be a hyperedge in E.
Then since z is a stable fractional matching in Q, there exists a vertex w in e such that
z(e) +
∑
f∈F (w) : fBwe
z(f) = 1.
Assume that w = vk for some vertex v in e and some integer k in {1, 2, . . . , |E(v)|}. Notice
that e = hvk. For each integer i in {1, 2, . . . , k}, we assume that hvi = ei. Notice that ek = e,
e1 v e2 v · · · v ek, and e v f holds for every hyperedge f in E(v) \ {e1, e2, . . . , ek}. For
each integer i in {1, 2, . . . , k}, x(ei) = z(hvi ). If k = 1, then
1 = z(e) +
∑
f∈F (w) : fBwe





























Figure 2 (a) A hypergraph H = (V, E) such that e3 v1 e2, e2 v2 e1, e2 v3 e4, e4 v4 e3,
e5 v5 e4, e6 v6 e4, e7 v8 e6, and e7 v9 e5. (b) The directed graph D constructed from H.
If k > 1, then
1 = z(e) +
∑
f∈F (w) : fBwe
z(f)













These imply that x is a stable fractional matching in P . This completes the proof.
4 Proof of Theorem 3
Throughout this section, we assume that we are given a hypergraphic preference system
P such that deg(P ) = 2. Define V ∗ as the set of vertices v in V such that |E(v)| = 2. In
addition, we define the directed graph D = (N,A) as follows. For each hyperedge e in E, N
contains a vertex ne. For each vertex v in V ∗, A contains an arc from nf to ne, where we
assume that distinct hyperedges e, f in E contain v and e v f . See Figure 2 for an example
of D.
Our algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. This algorithm can be intuitively explained
as follows. If there exists a vertex ne in N such that any arc in A does not leave ne, then
the hyperedge e is most preferred by every vertex v in e. Thus, we set the value for e to be
1. For every arc a = (nf , ne) in A, since some vertex in V is contained in e, f , we must set
the value for f to be 0. Then we can remove vertices in N whose value is determined from
D. We repeat this. Finally, we obtain a directed graph D′ in which the out-degree of every
vertex is at least one. Thus, by setting the value for each vertex of D′ to be 1/2, we can
construct a stable fractional matching in P .
Here we apply Algorithm 1 for the example in Figure 2. Since ne7 is the only vertex such
that any arc in At does not leave this vertex, we set ξ2(ne7) := 1 and the value of ξ2 for
other vertex is equal to 0. Then the vertices ne5 , ne6 , ne7 (and the arcs around them) are
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Algorithm 1:
1 Define D1 := D and N1 := N .
2 Define the vector ξ1 in RN+ by ξ1(v) := 0 for each vertex v in N .
3 Set t := 1.
4 while there exists a vertex v in Nt such that any arc of Dt does not leave v do
5 Define St as the set of vertices v in Nt such that any arc of Dt does not leave v.
6 Define the vector ξt+1 in RN+ by ξt+1(v) := 1 for each vertex v in St and
ξt+1(v) := ξt(v) for each vertex v in N \ St.
7 Define Tt as the set of vertices v in Nt such that there exists an arc of Dt from v
to some vertex in St.
8 Define Nt+1 := Nt \ (St ∪ Tt), and Dt+1 as the subgraph of Dt induced by Nt+1.
9 Set t := t+ 1.
10 end
11 Define the vector ξ∗ in RN+ by ξ∗(v) := 1/2 for each vertex v in Nt and ξ∗(v) := ξt(v)
for each vertex v in N \Nt.
12 Define the vector x in RE+ by x(e) := ξ∗(ne) for each hyperedge e in E.
13 Output x, and halt.
removed. In the remaining graph, for every vertex, at least one arc leaves it. Thus, the value
1/2 are assigned to the remaining vertices, and the algorithm halts. In the obtained stable
fractional matching x, x(ei) = 1/2 for every integer i in {1, 2, 3, 4}, x(e5) = 0, x(e6) = 0, and
x(e7) = 1.
I Lemma 7. The output of Algorithm 1 is a stable fractional matching in P .
Proof. Assume that Algorithm 1 halts when t = k. For proving this lemma, it suffices to
prove the following conditions are satisfied.
(P1) For every arc a = (u, v) in A, we have ξ∗(u) + ξ∗(v) ≤ 1.
(P2) For every vertex v in N such that ξ∗(v) 6= 1, there exist a vertex w in N such that an
arc from v to w is contained in A and ξ∗(v) + ξ∗(w) = 1.
We first prove (P1). Assume that we are given an arc a = (u, v) in A. If ξ∗(u) = 0, then
(P1) clearly holds. Next we assume that ξ∗(u) = 1. Then there exists a positive integer t
such that u ∈ Nt and any arc of Dt does not leave u. Notice that v /∈ Nt. This implies
that ξ∗(v) ∈ {0, 1}. If ξ∗(v) = 1, then then there exists a positive integer t′ such that t′ < t,
v ∈ Nt′ , and any arc of Dt′ does not leave v. Furthermore, the definition of Tt′ implies that
u ∈ Tt′ . This implies that u /∈ Nt, which contradicts the fact that u ∈ Nt. Thus, we have
ξ∗(v) = 0. Lastly, we consider the case where ξ∗(u) = 1/2, i.e., u ∈ Nk. If ξ∗(v) = 1, then
u /∈ Nk, which contradicts the fact that u ∈ Nk. This implies that ξ∗(v) ∈ {0, 1/2}. This
completes the proof of (P1).
Next we prove (P2). Assume that we are given a vertex v in N such that ξ∗(v) 6= 1.
Assume that ξ∗(v) = 0. In this case, there exists a positive integer t such that v ∈ Tt. That
is, there exists a vertex w in St such that there exists an arc of Dt from v to w. Since w ∈ St,
ξ∗(w) = 1. This implies that ξ∗(v) + ξ∗(w) = 1. Next we assume that ξ∗(v) = 1/2. In this
case, there exists a vertex w in Nk such that there exists an arc of Dk from v to w. Since
ξ∗(w) = 1/2, we have ξ∗(v) + ξ∗(w) = 1. This completes the proof. J
Proof of Theorem 3. This theorem immediately follows from Lemma 7. J
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5 Proof of Theorem 4
In this section, we prove Theorem 4. Since a stable fractional matching is clearly an ε-stable
fractional matching for any positive rational number ε, Theorem 1 (i.e., the fact that Frac-
tional Hypergraph Matching is in PPAD) implies that Approximate Fractional
Hypergraph Matching is in PPAD. What remains is to prove that every problem in
PPAD is reducible to Approximate Fractiona Hypergraph Matching in polynomial
time. For this, Theorem 1 implies that it is sufficient to prove that Fractional Hyper-
graph Matching is reducible to Approximate Fractional Hypergraph Matching in
polynomial time. This fact immediately follows from the following lemma.
I Lemma 8. Assume that we are given a hypergraphic preference system P = (V,E, {v}).
Furthermore, we define ε := 1/220|E|4 . Then we can construct a stable fractional matching in
P from an ε-stable fractional matching in P in polynomial time.
Notice that the bit-length of ε in Lemma 8 is bounded by a polynomial in the size of P .
More precisely, the bit-length of ε in Lemma 8 is O(|E|4).
What remains is to prove Lemma 8. We prove Lemma 8 by using the following known
result called LP compactness. Assume that we are given positive integers m,n and vectors
a in Qm×n and b in Qm, where Q is the set of rational numbers. Then we consider the
following linear inequality system whose variable is a vector x in Rn.
n∑
j=1
a(i, j) · x(j) ≥ b(i) (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}). (12)
For each positive real number δ and each vector y in Rn, we say that y satisfies the linear
inequality system (12) to within δ, if
n∑
j=1
a(i, j) · y(j) ≥ b(i)− δ
for every integer i in {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
I Theorem 9 (LP compactness (see [10, Lemma 4.11])). Assume that we are given positive
integers m,n and vectors a in Qm×n and b in Qm. Furthermore, we assume that there exists
a positive integer β satisfying the condition that for every pair of integers i in {1, 2, . . . ,m}
and j in {1, 2, . . . , n}, there exist integers p, q, r, s such that a(i, j) = p/q, b(i) = r/s, and
|p|, |q|, |r|, |s| ≤ 2β. Then we consider the following linear inequality system whose variable is
a vector x in Rn.
n∑
j=1
a(i, j) · x(j) ≥ b(i) (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}). (13)
If there exists a vector y in Rn satisfying the linear inequality system (13) to within 1/220n4β,
then there exists a vector x in Rn that is feasible for the linear inequality system (13).
We are now ready to prove Lemma 8.
Proof of Lemma 8. Assume that we are given an ε-stable fractional matching y in P . For




y(f) ≥ 1− ε.
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Notice that since y in an ε-stable fractional matching in P , U(e) 6= ∅ for any hyperedge e in








x(f) ≥ 1 (e ∈ E, v ∈ U(e))
x(e) ≥ 0 (e ∈ E). (14)
Notice that the number of constraints of the linear inequality system (14) is bounded by a
polynomial in the input size of Fractional Hypergraph Matching.
Notice that y satisfies the linear inequality system (14) to within 1/220|E|4 . Thus, by
setting n := |E| and β := 1, Theorem 9 implies that there exists a vector x in RE that is
feasible for the linear inequality system (14). Notice that we can find a vector x in RE that
is feasible for the linear inequality system (14) in polynomial time by using the ellipsoid
method [9].
Let x be a vector in RE that is feasible for the linear inequality system (14). Then we
prove that x is a stable fractional matching in P . For this, it suffices to prove that for every




x(f) = 1. (15)










for every vertex v in U(e). Since U(e) 6= ∅, this implies that there exists a vertex v in e
satisfying (15). This completes the proof. J
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